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The financialisation of housing land supply in England
Abstract
The aim of this article is to identify the calculative practices that turn urban development 
planning into the supply-side of land financialisation.  My focus is on the statutory planning of 
housing supply and the accounting procedures, or market devices, that normalise the practices 
of land speculation in the earliest stage of the urban development process.   I provide an analysis 
of the accountancy regime used by planning authorities in England to evidence a  5-year supply 
of housing land. Drawing on the work of Michel Callon on market framing, I assess the 
activities of economic agents in performing or ‘formatting’ this supply, its boundaries, 
externalities and rules of operation. I evidence the effect of this formatting in normalising the 
treatment of land as a financial asset and in orienting the statutory regulation of land supply to 
the provision of opportunities for the capture of increased ground rent at a cost to the delivery 
of new homes. 
Keywords: town planning, land value, financialisation, housing supply, housebuilding.
Page 1 of 22
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
Introduction
The liberalisation of town planning systems has been a necessary accompaniment to the 
increasing financialisation of land and housing markets (Rydin, 2013; Savini & Aalbers, 2016). 
Rather than serving to moderate “the increasing tendency to treat the land as a pure financial 
asset” (Harvey 1982: 387), town planning is now seen as instrumental to property market 
growth. In many countries in the Global North planning for the provision of new housing and 
public infrastructure is largely determined by the pursuit of ground rent by private developers 
and landowners (Christophers, 2017; Robertson, 2017). The marketisation of a public service 
ostensibly intended to ensure the just distribution of costs and benefits from the development 
of land has been achieved most effectively through the incorporation of ‘market devices’ or 
modes of evaluation drawn from the accounting and asset management practices of finance 
markets (Callon, 2016; Callon, Millo & Muniesa, 2007). As these market systems are adopted 
and embedded in practice they come to construct the realities and norms of land use planning 
and to determine the values and judgements applied by planning authorities in regulating 
development (Miller & Rose, 2008).  
My aim in this article is to direct attention to the calculative practices that render town planning 
the supply-side of land financialisation. I provide an analysis of the accountancy regime used 
by planning authorities in England to allocate, maintain, and evidence a  5-year supply of 
housing land. The focus of study is on the “invisible power of an inscription” (Latour, 1987: 
14) – in this case an annual monitoring account of housing land supply – to not only shape
choices and influence decisions but to transform the world it describes and to obstruct the
policy goals it is intended to help implement (Miller, 2001). The argument I advance is that the
accounting procedures for a 5-year housing land supply in England normalised land speculation
as the condition for housebuilding while instituting perverse incentives for landowners and
developers to reduce the supply of new homes.
The article contributes to an evolving literature on the “thread of networks of practices and 
instruments, of documents and translations” that establish the conditions for the financialisation 
of land and housing (Latour, 1991: 121). I am concerned with the technical procedures or self-
steering mechanisms that substitute “a logic of exchange value for a logic of use value in land-
use decisions” (Haila, 1988: 97). I draw on Michel Callon’s (1998) definition of markets as 
calculative devices to interpret the 5-year housing land supply regime as the accountancy, co-
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ordination and framing of a market in land speculation (Callon & Muniesa, 2005). I investigate 
the distribution of power relations within the market frame, the activities of the economic 
agents in manipulating the calculation and their work in performing or ‘formatting’ the market, 
its boundaries, externalities and rules of operation (Araujo, 2007: 220). The literature on 
financialization has focused on the performative role of calculative devices in enabling real 
estate to be rendered liquid and globally tradeable. The financial instruments that facilitated 
the securitisation of mortgages and collateralised rental streams ushered in a new wave of 
housing speculation; the calculation of development viability recalibrated the town planning 
system to privilege the requirements of global capital flows (Blakeley, 2019; McAllister, 
2019). The role of the state in licensing these devices of financialization has been central to the 
process. The deregulation of the mortgage market by statutory regulators, the privatization of 
public land by state agencies and the introduction of new accounting practices in public 
services have created the conditions and supplied the components for financialization (Aalbers, 
2016; Christophers, 2018). This paper makes a significant addition to existing work on the role 
of the statutory planning system in facilitating the financialization of landed property 
(Waldron, 2019; Ward & Swyngedouw, 2018). It identifies these processes at the earliest stage 
in the urban development process and in the market in land separable from, and at the expense 
of, the supply of housing.  It demonstrates the performative impact of statutory planning 
practices in formatting the market for the speculation in land and in establishing the supply-
side conditions required for landowners to treat their property as a financial asset (Crosby & 
Henneberry, 2016).
The article begins by providing a definition of financialization in the context of housing 
development planning. My intent is to identify the role of residential planning permission in 
creating and enhancing value distinct from the financial rewards of development. I then 
introduce the accountancy procedure for housing supply adopted in the English town planning 
system and review it through the literature on calculative practices and particularly through 
Michel Callon’s work on market framing.  I evidence the relationship between housing 
development and land speculation and identify the externalities included within the frame of 
housing supply that tilted the accountancy procedure towards financialization. I support this 
analysis with a details of the expansion of financial markets in residential planning permission 
and review the response in housing policy to the growth in the trading of residential planning 
permissions.  Finally, I explore the performative effect of housing land accountancy in 
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embedding the use of land as a financial asset in the urban development process and I conclude 
by assessing the impact of financialization on the rate and scale of housing development. 
Town planning and the financialization of land
The land market provides a consummate model for the theory of financialization since its 
measure of value depends on pulling future profit into present-day circulation (Ryan-Collins, 
Lloyd & Macfarlane, 2017). Landownership is a monopoly on space that enables landowners  
to charge ground rent or its capitalized equivalent for the use of their land. Since land itself 
does not embody value, and is a natural and finite resource that cannot be replicated,  this 
ground rent must be treated as a transfer of value created elsewhere (Christophers, 2010). 
“What is bought and sold is not the land, but title to the ground rent yielded by it,” David 
Harvey (2006: 367) wrote. “The buyer acquires a claim upon anticipated future revenues, a 
claim upon the future fruits of labour.”  The concept of financialisation is already implicit in 
this division between the utility value of land as a prerequisite for life and labour and its 
exchange value as a charge on the fruits of that labour. To treat land as a pure financial asset is 
to privilege its potential yield in ground rent rather than its usefulness as a productive resource 
(Haila, 1988).  Land treated as a financial asset has no use other than to bear exchange value 
calculated in the expectation of steadily increasing rents due to the labour of others (Massey & 
Catalano, 1978). The income from it is a rentier claim on the production process. It is a supply 
of credit secured on putative profits from potential production (Christophers, 2018; Gunnoe, 
2014). The treatment of land as a financial asset has driven the expansion of global financial 
markets and the focus on real estate and especially housing stocks as opportunities for 
investment (Aalbers, 2016; Ward, & Swyngedouw, 2018). Immobile and finite, land 
nevertheless becomes a liquid asset, its monopoly rent tradable on global markets, resulting in 
the ascendancy of “financial markets, financial motives, financial institutions, and financial 
elites in the operation of the economy” (Epstein, 2005: 3). It is the force behind house price 
inflation and the growing problem of housing affordability (Murphy, 2019), and while the 
impact of financialisation is felt in high household debt, wage stagnation,  and regional 
economic inequality, an ever-increasing share of economic output accrues to rentiers who reap 
‘unearned’ profits from monopoly rents (Blakely, 2019).  
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This ‘unearned’ increment in land value has long been a central concern of town planning since 
the grant of planning permission enables the expectation of increased ground rent. 
Planning permission unlocks the value of infrastructure improvements serving the location of 
land as well as the potential increase in ground rent from the actual change of use (Crook, & 
Whitehead, 2019). The challenge for town planning has been to capture and fairly distribute 
this ‘betterment’ or land value uplift to recognize the part played by public investment in 
bringing about increased land values (Catney & Henneberry, 2019).  This problem came 
sharply into focus in the controversy over the use of development viability assessments in the 
English town planning system. The introduction of a standard approach to valuation in an 
assessment of development viability prioritized private profit and recognized the landowner’s 
right to a commercial return from the uplift in land value (Christophers, 2014). The  effect of 
this calculative practice was to distribute betterment to the developer and landowner leaving 
little or nothing to pay for the increased public infrastructure costs and contributions to 
affordable housing (Crosby & Wyatt, 2016; McAllister, 2017). As a market device, 
development viability assessments are widely understood to have embedded the values and 
expectations of the speculative house-building industry in the statutory planning system, 
normalizing excessive profits for developers, and creating an expectation among landowners 
of extravagant uplift in land values consequent on the granting of residential planning 
permission (Crosby, 2019; McAllister, Street, & Wyatt, 2016). 
In the unequal distribution of betterment brought about by development viability assessments, 
the uplift in land values was dependent on a development proposal, and it was the future 
increase in ground rent (or income from the sale of houses) that landowners and speculative 
builders aimed to capture.  The expectation of betterment locks-in particular approaches to 
investing in and producing the built environment that have implications for any future 
development (Crosby & Henneberry, 2016). The speculative housebuilding industry developed 
in England in order to minimise the loss of potential building revenues to landowner profits. 
This industry, now largely dominated by ten companies, straddles land and housing markets in 
order to capture both building profits and the capitalised ground rent from house sales (Ball, 
1985; Edwards, 2015). Ground rent and house value, however, are two quite distinct 
components making up house prices. The uplift in the exchange value of land brought about 
through the planning system can be calculated separately to the value of the housing built on it 
(Smith, 1984). The award of planning permission may enable a landowner to profit from 
increased investment yields without any development necessarily taking place.  Most land in 
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England is still owned by the aristocracy and other wealthy individuals, and by property 
companies and the financial services industry, represented by pension funds, insurance 
companies and hedge funds (Shrubsole, 2019). Their interest is in increasing the yields from 
land ownership and in maximising asset value to finance new acquisitions.  It is the expectation 
of future increases in ground rent that ensures the rise in land values and finances their 
borrowing (Massey & Catalano, 1978). 
Land is financialized to the extent that landowners can separate exchange value from use value 
and reap the benefits of future ground rent without making the investment that generates this 
uplift in value (Christophers, 2010). The grant of planning permission becomes a promissory 
note, a marker or claim on the future income accruing to land that itself becomes an object of 
exchange (Ward & Swyngedouw, 2018). Land whose increasing value has been certified 
through the grant of planning permission can be traded or used as collateral and leveraged to 
access credit. The town planning process becomes instrumental to the creation and 
enhancement of financial markets in land and housing, and because these markets are global, 
land with the gift of planning permission is detached not only from the locale in which it is 
situated but from the productive use to which it, and its putative development, may contribute 
(Savini & Aalbers, 2016). In its role in allocating the land and permitting the proposed 
development, town planning then becomes the supply side of land financialization.
A 5-year housing land supply
A housing land supply that is increasingly organised around the appropriation and 
maximisation of ground rents is likely to impact on the supply of housing, influencing not only 
where houses are built and at what price they are sold, but whether homes are built at all 
(Robertson, 2017).  
Planning policy in England is overwhelmingly concerned with providing a supply-side 
stimulus to the private housing market.  While ostensibly administering a plan-led system in 
which development can be directed to achieve long-term public interest goals, this regime 
works to facilitate the market by lifting the environmental restrictions that ration the supply of 
developable land (TCPA, 2018). The role of local planning authorities is to deliver a reliable 
pipeline of permissioned land to enable the speculative housebuilding industry to increase the 
delivery of housing (Cochrane, Colenutt & Field, 2015). The requirement to allocate and 
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account for a 5-year housing land supply is a feature of this deregulatory agenda and its neutral 
recording function operates within a disciplinary regime that evidences the role of accountancy 
as a technology of liberal governance (Miller, 2001). Failure by local planning authorities to 
maintain and annually update a 5-year supply of housing land enables developers and 
landowners to override local land use regulation through a clause in national planning policy 
called the ‘presumption in favour of sustainable development’ (MHCLG, 2019 para. 11). 
“Framed in unprecedented language” this policy makes it difficult to refuse speculative 
housebuilding applications that go against the local plan  (TCPA, 2018: 124). Developers and 
landowners who appeal to the Secretary of State against the refusal of planning permission can 
argue that a local planning authority does not have a 5-year housing land supply. Failure to 
demonstrate the required account of land has become the most frequently given reason for the 
granting of residential planning permission against the refusal of the local authority (Lichfields, 
2018).  This linkage of accountancy with responsibility introduced a range of intended and 
unintended incentives into the housing supply market.  Local planning authorities were 
incentivized – through the threat of sanctions – to pro-actively allocate housing land and 
privilege the release of land for new homes over other policy concerns.   Developers and 
landowners were incentivized to find evidence that the accounting for 5-year housing land 
supplies was inadequate.
The calculation of a 5-year supply of housing land was accounted for by local planning 
authorities in an annual monitoring report identifying sites with residential planning permission 
and those allocated in development plans for house building. The documentation included a 
spreadsheet identifying sites and their anticipated housing output allocated across a five year 
period. Each site was annotated with evidence in support of its housing contribution gathered 
from discussions with landowners and developers and observations of site conditions and stage 
of production.  
In the work of Michel Callon (1998) markets are defined by the calculation of supply; they are 
a “space of goods” or a catalogue of products classified according to their qualities and 
characteristics and ordered in a single space conceived of as the account (Callon & Muniesa, 
2005: 200). This calculative space provides a coordinating function; it  enrolls economic actors 
who seek to define the boundaries of the market by manipulating and modifying the 
characteristics of the products supplied. “The qualification of goods is at the heart of economic 
competitions and the organization of markets,” as Callon explained (Callon, Meadel & 
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Rabeharisoa, 2002:200).  The 5-year housing land supply served to coordinate economic actors 
– the owners and developers of land and the planning authority – around a calculation of the
local land market (Callon, 1998).  A minimum number of sites had to be identified in the
spreadsheet to provide the level of housebuilding sufficient to meet the annual target of the
authority’s assessed housing need over a five year period.  The key criteria for these specific
sites was that they were ‘deliverable’ and the interpretation of this term and arguments over
the admissibility of sites provided landowners and developers with an opportunity to define the
market according to their strategic interest. Land considered deliverable that could be included
in the 5-year supply chain had to be “available now, offer a suitable location for development
now, and be achievable with a realistic prospect that housing will be delivered on the site within
five years” (MHCLG, 2019, para. 67). The definition made site deliverability dependent on
changes in housing markets and on the behaviour of landowners and their agents in site
promotion.  As the main providers of housing, the speculative housebuilders held a significant
advantage in characterising land as deliverable: they were able to influence housing delivery
over a five-year period through the time taken to build-out sites.
 ‘Buffers’, ‘slippage’ and unimplemented permissions
The “poor supply responsiveness” of the private builders was identified as a problem in the 
Barker Review of Housing Supply (2003: 5), and the Calcutt review (DCLG, 2007) confirmed 
the tendency of housebuilders to deliberately restrict build-out rates in order to maintain prices 
(Archer & Cole, 2014; Adams, Leishman & Moore, 2009).  A “drip-feed” of between 30-60 
homes completed per year per sales outlet was evidenced across all housing sites, with large 
sites building out most slowly (Adams & Leishman, 2008: 7; Lichfields 2017; Letwin, 2018). 
The perennial assertion that housebuilders were land-banking, that is profiting from increased 
land values rather than actually building houses, was more difficult to prove.  The top 
housebuilders in the UK hold an average supply pipeline of six years’ worth of land with 
planning permission (Chamberlain Walker, 2017) with options to develop a further six or seven 
years of sites (Jefferys, 2016). Competition between the ten companies that dominate the 
industry is predominantly over access to land supplies, rather than over the price or quality of 
housing sold (Cochrane, Colenutt, & Field, 2015). Research from the Local Government 
Association and others pointed to an increasing backlog of land with unimplemented residential 
planning permissions (Bentley, 2016; LGA, 2018; Shelter, 2017). In 2018 it was estimated that 
there was a stock of 850,000 unbuilt permissioned homes (TCPA, 2018). Research by the 
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development consultancy Lichfields (2017) identified what the industry called a ‘lapse rate’ in 
residential permissions, with as many as 40 to 50 per cent of homes given planning permission 
never getting built.  Earlier research by the Department of Communities and Local Government 
confirmed that 10-20 per cent of permissions each year were never implemented while a further 
15-20 per cent were subject to major changes with new permissions sought. A study
commissioned by Barratt Homes identified a lapse rate between 16 and 20 per cent of all
permissioned sites, with around half the lapsed sites sold by the developer or landowner at a
value inflated by the grant of residential planning permission (Chamberlain Walker, 2017).
The scale of unimplemented residential planning permissions in the supply chain pointed to 
speculation by housebuilders on the uplift generated by planning permission. Lapsed sites were 
stalled for financial reasons rather than because of site development issues (McAllister, Street 
& Wyatt, 2016). Although land purchase and development were more profitable than land 
dealing alone, the speculative housebuilding model demanded limited production runs to 
maintain pricing and a substantial cash flow to operate in both land and housing markets (Ball, 
1983; Edwards, 2015).   Sites selected for housebuilding were those that offered the highest 
margins and the decision to ‘lapse’ permissioned land suggested it offered a better return as a 
tradable asset than as a resource for production (Griffith, 2011). The uplift on greenfield land 
in areas of high housing demand in England could be more than 100 times existing use value 
(DCLG, 2015). Agricultural land in Oxfordshire for example, typically worth £25,000 a 
hectare, might be valued at £5.6 million a hectare with residential planning permission – an 
increase of 224 times (Murphy, 2019). 
The treatment of land as a financial asset rather than a productive resource was facilitated by 
the accounting policies of the 5-year land supply. Planning authorities were mandated by 
government to allocate a land supply that was calculated to respond to the current supply 
responsiveness of the housebuilding industry (DCLG, 2012). They were directed to add a 
‘buffer’ of between five and 20 per cent more land to their supply of deliverable sites depending 
on the rate of housing completions over the preceding years, “to ensure choice and competition 
in the market for land” (MHCLG, 2019a: para. 73). In addition they were advised to allow for 
‘slippage’ on the standard build-out rate and to provide significantly more land than needed in 
order to accommodate the lapse of unimplemented permissions in their region (Chamberlain 
Walker, 2017; Lichfields, 2017).  The 5-year monitoring report intended to calculate a land 
supply for housebuilding included in the frame what might otherwise have been considered 
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externalities (Callon, 1998): the shortfall in housing production and the lapse rate in 
unimplemented planning permissions. These items were factored into the overall housing land 
requirement and framed the market as inclusive of demand for land as a financial asset as well 
for housing production. The 5-year supply regime formatted a market in land that enabled and, 
it could be argued, positively encouraged the producer to become a rentier.
The ability of landowners and developers to influence the characteristics and qualities of sites 
positioned in the “space of calculability” of the 5-year supply was facilitated by the sanctions 
regime of the presumption in favour of sustainable development (Callon, 1998: 22).  Planning 
Inspectors at appeal heard arguments that sites identified as deliverable in the 5-year supply 
were in fact lapsed or stalled, would be built-out at a slower rate than predicted, or that the 
builder had provided evidence that they intended to deliver a smaller number of units than that 
given planning permission (CPRE, 2014a; TCPA, 2018). Success at appeal enabled developers 
and landowners to secure residential planning permission on more greenfield sites and thus to 
secure an uplift in value that could be capitalized against future ground rents. ‘Planning by 
appeal’ in turn led to ‘planning by surrender’ and local authorities allocated sites for housing 
even when they did not meet the requirements of planning policy in the knowledge that to 
refuse permission would result in a challenge to their 5-year land supply (CPRE, 2014b). The 
only response available to local planning authorities was to increase the amount of 
permissioned land beyond the scope of any challenge.  The number of homes awarded planning 
permission doubled in the five years following the introduction of the housing land supply 
regime in 2012. By 2019 local planning authorities in every region except London were 
approving far more homes than required to meet their assessed housing need  (Hampson & 
Ward, 2019).
The account of land assembled to deliver a sufficient supply of housing over a 5 year period 
concealed within its frame a parallel supply of land allocated for financial appreciation and 
exchange rather than housebuilding. An account or a spreadsheet appears transparent, but 
conceals the subjectivity of the actors and the actions behind the numbers (Mennicken & 
Miller, 2012). Quantification has an impersonal logic that produces objectivity and invisibility 
at the same time. The accountancy of the 5-year supply effectively normalized the treatment of 
land as a financial asset and expanded the supply-side of land financialization. The most 
compelling evidence for this expansion was the emergence of a new speculative industry in 
land promotion.
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The rise of site promoters and the market in permissions
The calculative regime of a 5-year housing land supply created a particular way of 
understanding and representing the housing market (Miller, 2001). It rendered an apparent 
problem of housing supply, and an actual crisis of affordability, as a shortage of permissioned 
land. In accounting for land, but not housing supply, it created uncertainty in the space between 
permission and completion, developability and deliverability, and framed a market in which 
land trading and speculation on permissions became an accepted component of the urban 
development process. Local planning authorities made more land available for development 
but witnessed only marginal growth in the number of homes built and no improvement in their 
affordability (Gallent, 2019). What local planning authorities were required to do in accounting 
for a 5-year housing land supply was to itemise sites that were deliverable. Whether or not 
those sites actually delivered was not in the control of the local authority. This conundrum was 
succinctly expressed by Lord Justice Lindblom in a landmark ruling in the Court of Appeal in 
2017 when he noted that, “the assessment of a housing land supply does not require certainty 
that the sites will actually be developed within that period” (Court of Appeal 2017, para. 51).  
This legal judgement went to the heart of the problem of the ‘space of calculability’ in the 5-
year land supply. The focus on the deliverability of sites had symbolically detached a market 
in permissioned land from any subsequent responsibility for developing homes.
The number of non-builders securing planning permission for housing grew rapidly under the 
5-year housing land supply accountancy regime (Wilding, 2018).  This market was
spearheaded by site promoters who obtained outline planning permission on behalf of
landowners and took a 25 per cent cut of the consequent uplift in land value realised when the 
site was sold. The interest of site promoters was in obtaining outline planning permission not 
in developing the site. Once outline permission was obtained the site promoter would engineer 
a competitive auction for the permissioned land, generating higher values for the landowner 
than if the site had been optioned to a single developer (Richborough Estates, 2017). Once a 
housebuilder bought the site, they had to make a reserved matters application to address any 
planning obligations negotiated by the site promoters or make a completely new application to 
tailor the development to their needs. By 2017 site promoters held around 13 per cent of all 
residential planning permissions (Chamberlain Walker, 2017). The number of outline rather 
than detailed planning permissions increased markedly, from only 26,000 in 2015 to over 
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40,000 by 2017, significantly lengthening the time taken to develop a site. Outside London, 
site promoters were responsible for more than 40 per cent of all outline planning permissions 
(Lichfields, 2018b).  They made speculative applications for land normally excluded from 
development under planning policy, targeting local planning authorities with out-of-date Local 
Plans or gaps in their 5-year housing land supply (CPRE, 2018).  Land values were raised 
through competitive auction and the increase passed on to the homebuyer in higher house prices 
(Fraser, 2017).  In London, where over 25 per cent of all sites with residential planning 
permission were held by non-developers, outline planning permission became a tradeable asset 
(Jefferys, 2017). Site promoters financialised the planning permission process and created a 
profitable market in outline permissions.  The requirement on local authorities to calculate 
‘deliverable’ sites, rather than completed homes had opened a market in ‘deliverables’ as a 
commodity: one that could be traded without ever being turned into completions.  
Focusing on land release and ‘deliverability’ the housing supply accountancy regime created 
the conditions for the expansion of land investment markets. Acknowledging the inclusion of 
“perverse incentives in the housing supply regime” (May, 2018),  government amended the 
accounting procedure and changed the definition of a ‘deliverable’ site to exclude sites with 
outline planning permission (MHCLG, 2018). Local planning authorities were advised to 
include in their account of housing land supply only those sites with detailed residential 
planning permission unless they could provide convincing evidence the homes would be built 
in the five year period.  They were obliged to revise their 5-year housing land accounts and 
remove from the list all allocated sites without confirmed build programmes. To compensate 
for this reduction in the overall calculation of supply, planning authorities were forced to 
accelerate the approval of housebuilder applications (Connelly, 2019). The requirement to plan 
for deliverability was now to be accompanied by a responsibility on local authorities to account 
for delivery. The connection between accountancy and this further responsibility was enforced 
by new sanctions introduced in a Housing Delivery Test.
The normalisation of planning for land speculation
Launched by government in 2018 as a standard approach to measuring the delivery of 
completed homes, the Housing Delivery Test was a percentage measurement of the number of 
homes delivered against target. It came attached to a package of sanctions that were 
increasingly onerous on planning authorities as the policy bedded in over a three year period 
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(MHCLG, 2018). By 2021, when the sanctions reached their most challenging level, it was 
estimated that almost 40 per cent of all local planning authorities would fail the Housing 
Delivery Test on the basis that housebuilders in their area had not provided the homes needed 
(Hampson & Ward, 2019). This would give developers and landowners another route to trigger 
the presumption in favour of sustainable development, overturn local planning policy and gain 
access to a wider range of permissioned land.
The Housing Delivery Test imposed constraints on local planning authorities at the other end 
of the supply pipeline from the allocation of sites. It located responsibility for a failure to 
develop homes on planning authorities already held culpable for rationing the supply of 
deliverable land. In order to induce housebuilders to actually deliver homes, planning 
authorities were advised to make sure the profits from development were more attractive than 
those to be earned from land speculation.  They were told to make more commercially desirable 
greenfield land available for housing and to remove planning obligations in order to increase 
the residual ground rent taken by landowners from the proceeds of development (PAS, 2019). 
Together the Housing Delivery Test and the regulations for the 5-year housing land supply 
summoned planning authorities to accept the financialisation of housing land as an inevitable 
part of the housebuilding business model. The expected response at both ends of the supply 
chain was to reduce regulation and release more land and both actions only served to increase 
the opportunities for financial speculation.
The 5-year housing land accountancy regime was introduced on the understanding that the 
town and country planning system was primarily responsible for the slow supply 
responsiveness of the housebuilding industry (Barker, 2004). The fact that the Housing 
Delivery Test penalised local planning authorities for the failure to deliver of private 
housebuilders came in the face of compelling – and acknowledged – evidence that the problem 
of unresponsive housing supply was not wholly related to restraints on the supply of land 
(NAO, 2019).  Accounting for new housing supply on a site by site basis, and monitoring starts 
and build-out over a five year period,  planners were acutely aware of the structural problems 
in the urban development model and the impact of financialised land strategies on the delivery 
of new homes (DCLG, 2017).  The effect of the accountancy procedure, however, was to 
abstract from the policy goal of increasing housing supply and render it a technical calculation 
involving the updating of a spreadsheet (Callon, Millo & Muniesa, 2007).  The task of 
maintaining a policy-compliant 5-year land supply required planners to monitor progress in 
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permissions and commencement works, identify and replace lapsed sites and calculate 
slippage, re-calculate supply and make substitutions. Planners had to be aware of the changes 
in land market strategies and the emerging interests of all economic actors convened around 
the 5-year account. The account itself,  the 5-year space of calculability,  became the measure 
of the success of the housebuilding market. Local planning authorities were held to account for 
their account of housing supply. The policy discourse on housebuilding was framed by the 
evidence provided in the spreadsheet. What was immediately calculable, and therefore visible, 
was the success or failure by a planning authority in maintaining a deliverable land supply. The 
supply manipulations and land machinations behind the account were not in sight. 
The accountancy regime normalised the process of financialisation as a characteristic of the 
development process. It fed the market with an increased supply of land as, in order to deliver 
their 5-year supply and avoid sanctions, local planning authorities boosted the number of 
permissioned homes (NAO, 2019). By 2019 local planning authorities were awarding planning 
permission for almost 400,000 homes a year, more than twice as many as were being built 
(TCPA, 2018). From 2012 to 2019 the number of permissioned homes in England increased 
by over 200,000 while the number of private sector homes actually built rose by only 48,530 
(MHCLG, 2019b, 2019d).  Increasing supply to compensate for land speculation legitimised 
the development ‘lapse rate’ or the percentage of unimplemented permissions traded for their 
betterment value. The consultancy Lichfields (2017) maintained that for the development 
industry to meet the government’s 300,000 annual housebuilding target would require a 
pipeline of permissioned land sufficient to build one million homes. A report for housebuilder 
Barratts argued that a stock of 1.25 million permissions was needed just to complete 250,000 
homes a year (Chamberlain Walker, 2017).  What had formerly been perceived as evidence of 
dysfunction in the development industry – a backlog of unimplemented permissions – was 
presented as no more than the minimum necessary supply. The industry now demanded a stock 
of permissioned land that was at least four times the size of its annual production run.  
The size of the finance market in permissioned land created by the 5-year accountancy regime 
is difficult to estimate since the ownership and transfer of land titles continues to defy attempts 
at transparency (Shrubsole, 2019). Some indication of its significance can be deduced from the 
impact on the numbers of homes built and the change in the production time for housing 
completions. It is evident that the trade in land with residential planning permission increased 
at a cost to the development of new homes. Private sector housebuilding grew slowly in the 
Page 14 of 22
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
years following the introduction of the 2012 accountancy regime, recovering from the slump 
of the global financial crash, and by 2018 had begun to plateau. Annual new build starts by the 
speculative housebuilding industry in England totaled 140,020 in 2018, and had started to fall 
in 2019, while completions appeared to have peaked at 134,400 (MHCLG, 2019b). In 2012 it 
took housebuilders an average of two years to complete a site once full planning permission 
had been obtained. By 2017, the build-out time had increased to four years (Chamberlain 
Walker, 2017).  By then, almost 60 per cent of all residential planning permissions were held 
by non-builders: site promoters, landowners and their agents, who then sold the undeveloped 
land to capitalise on its uplift (Winterburn, 2018). The length of time taken to build-out sites, 
and the number of sites with unimplemented permissions increased dramatically under the 5-
year housing supply accountancy regime. A lapse rate of unimplemented residential planning 
permissions averaging between 20 and 50 per cent of total annual permissions, depending on 
location, suggests that land for approximately 150,000 homes was taken out of production 
annually and sold without being developed (Lichfields, 2017).   
The financialisation of housing land supply: conclusions
In Michel Callon’s (1998) characterisation, markets are not already existing structures and 
processes. They function in an economy of movements and are constituted by the calculative 
practices of economic actors. It is the distribution of power relations within the network of 
actors and their strategies to influence the calculations and change the criteria of the space of 
goods that defines the rules of the market.  The point at which the market is codified and its 
norms established, Callon referred to as framing, but the term formatting used by Araujo (2007; 
also Crosby & Henneberry, 2016) more closely captures the performative process of market 
formation and the constitutive role of accountancy.  Calculative practices “do not merely record 
a reality independent of themselves; they contribute powerfully to shaping, simply by 
measuring it, the reality that they measure” (Callon, 1998: 23). The calculations of supply, and 
of the criteria, qualities, and values used to account for that supply, constitute the rules and 
expectations of the market which, in turn, shapes the way the economy of supply is understood 
and acted on (Miller & Rose, 2008).
The requirement on local authorities to maintain and report on a 5-year housing land supply 
appeared a necessary technical process to ensure a reliable pipeline of residential planning 
permissions. It provided a calculative procedure that framed the housing supply market and 
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convened its economic actors around a ‘space of calculability’.   The act of framing, however, 
could not wholly detach these economic actors from their relationship with land as a financial 
asset (Callon, 1998). Partly by policy design and partly by actor manipulation, externalities 
were included in the frame so that the account was formatted to include a supply of land that 
could be used as a financial asset as well as, and often instead of, a resource for housing 
delivery. The linking of accountancy and sanctions in national planning policy tilted the 
balance of power relations inevitably in favour of the landowners and developers who, in any 
case, already exercised considerable economic influence (Waldron, 2019). Their ability to 
shape the course of housing delivery over a five-year period through the time taken to develop 
sites, and by doing so, gain competitive advantage in access to additional ground rent, gave 
house-builders a perverse incentive to reduce responsiveness further. The accountancy of a 5-
year land supply provided a market device that enabled the uplift in land value to be captured 
independently of, and as a separate commercial practice to development value. It privileged 
concepts of investment yield, viability and commercial return at the earliest stage of decision-
making in the development planning process and applied those concepts as criteria for land 
supply targets that had little resemblance to any assessment of housing need. The housing land 
account was calculated to deliver a sufficient number of sites to satisfy the requirements of 
land speculation as well as housebuilding  and it became a normal expectation in urban 
development that landowners and developers would treat land as a financial asset rather than, 
or as well as, a productive resource.  In this decision-making framework the existence of a 
shadow market in the trade and investment of residential permissions was cast as an accepted 
feature of the development process to be compensated for by increases in the supply pipeline. 
The role of planning authorities under this procedure was to provide the stipulated supply of 
permissioned land whatever market it was intended for, and to compensate with further 
allocations for those sites withdrawn from production for investment yield or market sale.  A 
narrowly defined role for the town planning system as the mere licensing of private sector 
growth was embedded in the calculations (TCPA, 2018). The cost of this accountancy 
procedure in its approach to the resource management of environmental assets, in its failure to 
significantly increase housebuilding, in the delays it caused in the development process and its 
consequent impact on housing need, went largely unchallenged in town planning practice 
(CPRE, 2014; Murdoch & Abram, 2017; Spiers, 2018). 
In this study I aimed to demonstrate the performative power of a market device in displacing 
the urban development planning system from its public interest goals and orienting the 
Page 16 of 22
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
statutory regulation of land to the supply-side of financialisation. The incorporation of 
accountancy practices has been instrumental to the liberalisation of town planning systems in 
the Global North and has impacted on the values and judgements applied to housing and 
development markets, facilitating financial speculation in the market for land as well as 
housing.  When planning for housing is understood as the deregulation of land markets and the 
provision of opportunities for the private capture of ground rent, the resulting increase in 
speculation comes at a cost to the delivery of new homes.
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